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FIFTH AMENDMENT MIRANDA WAIVER AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE IN CASES OF
MENTALLY RETARDED AND MENTALLY ILL CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, all citizens are afforded protection against
compulsory self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and under the Voluntariness Doctrine of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 In situations of custodial interrogation
suspects must be given Mirandawarnings before questioning begins.2
Following the warnings, a suspect may choose to waive his rights and
proceed with the interrogation.3 The state has the burden of showing
that the individual knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. 4 If

' U.S. CONST. amend. X. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law,"; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law,"; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966) (concluding
persons in situations of custodial interrogation are afforded protections under the
Fifth Amendment).
2 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439 (recognizing that procedural safeguards
must be in place to secure the privilege); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 300 (1980). " 'Interrogation,' as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion,
must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody
itself." Id. Interrogation as defined by the Miranda opinion includes not only the
express words used by the police but also any actions that the police knows will
encourage an incriminating response from the suspect. Id. at 301.
'Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,
1043-44 (1983). When an accused has invoked his right to counsel a subsequent
waiver is effective only if the accused initiates conversation with the police. Id.
Evidence that the suspect answered subsequent police-initiated questions does not
amount to a valid waiver. Id. With regard to subsequent interrogations, the
burden is on the prosecution to show that the defendant made a valid waiver of
his right to counsel. Id. at 1044.
4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
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this burden is not met, any statements made by the individual will be
excluded from the court proceedings.5
Where the circumstances are not inherently coercive, citizens are
protected under the Voluntariness Doctrine of the Fourteenth
6
Amendment. In this case, statements will be admissible only if the
state can prove that the statements were made free from police coercion and that the suspect's will was not overborne. 7 Some of the
factors to consider in making this determination are the duration of
the interrogation, police conduct, and the defendant's state of mind.S
Assessing the nature and effect of an interrogation is further
complicated in cases involving individuals who are mentally retarded

' Id.; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (quoting
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). "Waivers of counsel must not only
be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case
'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused."' Id.
6 U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
7 Haynes v. State of Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963). A
confession
obtained through the use of threats violates due process. Id. The question is
whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time of his confession. Id. "In
short, the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely,
voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort." Id. (quoting
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896)); see Commonwealth v.
Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 428, 399 N.E.2d 460, 465 (1980) (holding voluntariness
is determined by an examination of the totality of circumstances).
' See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 689 (1993) (reiterating that
totality of circumstances analysis is used to decide whether confession violates
due process); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957) (quoting Stein v.
People of State of New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953)). "The limits in any case
depend upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of
resistance of the person confessing. What would be overpowering to the weak of
will or mind might be utterly ineffective against an experienced criminal." Id.
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or mentally ill. 9 In order to ensure that all citizens are afforded the
same protection, courts must consider and determine whether such
individuals are able to make truly voluntary statements and whether
they are able to understand Mianda warnings to the extent that they
can make a valid waiver.10 Since all cases will inevitably involve different circumstances this analysis must be done on a case by case basis."

The underlying premise for admissibility of statements, whether
made in a custodial setting or under any other circumstances, is that
the defendant understands his constitutional rights and the ramifica-12
tions of waiving those rights in favor of making an admission.
These steps require a certain level of cognitive sophistication.' 3 In

most circumstances, an adult's ability to perform these mental tasks is
taken for granted. In cases involving mentally retarded or mentally ill
defendants, however, one cannot assume that the defendant knowingly waived his rights. Although it would be prejudicial to assume
that these deficiencies automatically preclude the defendant's ability
to make voluntary statements, a standard practice must be in place to
provide guidance on how to proceed with an interrogation of such a

defendant.

14

9 See Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Mass. 846, 852, 448 N.E.2d 1114,
1119 (1983) (acknowledging that special considerations should be afforded to
mentally retarded defendants).
10Id.
Id. at 856.
1 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (warning that
safeguards must be in place to assure that defendant's rights are preserved).
13 See id. at 469 (recognizing that intelligence
is relevant to issue of
whether defendant understands his rights).
,4 Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 387 Mass. 96, 100, 438 N.E.2d 856, 859
(1982) (quoting Gibbs v. Warden of the Ga. State Penitentiary, 450 F.Supp. 242,
244 (Ga. 1978)). "[T]here is no per se rule holding inadmissible [statements]
given by individuals suffering severe psychotic conditions. Rather, a [statement]
is inadmissible if it would not have been obtained but for the effects of the
confessor's psychosis." Id.
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This article examines the protections afforded all citizens under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and then examines how these
protections can be extended to criminal defendants who are either
mentally retarded or mentally ill. Recognizing that such afflictions do
not, per se, prevent a defendant from making a voluntary and admissible confession, this article cautions that safeguards should be in
place to ensure that no one's constitutionally protected rights are
compromised.
Focusing on Massachusetts law, this paper considers the role of
the Humane Practice Doctrine in the protection of defendants' due
process rights. This two step process requires the judge to make an
initial determination of voluntariness and then instruct the jury to do
the same. 15 By adopting this procedure, courts in Massachusetts have
demonstrated an appreciation for the seriousness of this issue in the
judicial process.
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF
INCRIMINATION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in
relevant part, that, "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself' and that, "the accused
shall...have the assistance of counsel."' 6 In Miranda v. Arfizona , the
United States Supreme Court articulated a standard procedure for
law enforcement officers to follow before interrogating a suspect in
custody.18 Recognizing the fundamental right against self incrimina-

See Commonwealth v. Chung, 378 Mass. 451, 457, 392 N.E.2d 1015,
1019 (1979) (articulating two step process known as the Humane Practice
Doctrine).
,6U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
SId. at 467-68. The Court held that informing a defendant of his right to
'"

remain silent is a prerequisite to interrogation whether or not a defendant is
already familiar with that right. Id. "Assessments of the knowledge the
defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence,
or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation." Id. at 46869.
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tion, the Court held that any statements made by a defendant pursuant
to a custodial interrogation, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, are
not admissible unless the prosecution can show that steps were taken
to protect the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege. ' 9 The Court in
Miranda distinguished custodial interrogations from other forms of
questioning and investigation because it recognized the inherently coercive nature of such situations.20 In attempting to define the scope
of its holding, the Court defined custodial interrogations as, "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or2 1otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.",
In formulating a standard that law enforcement officers must
follow before initiating questioning, the Court enumerated warnings
that must be given to ensure that the privilege against self incrimination is protected.22 Specifically, the Court held that a suspect must be
warned of his right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may
be used against him, and that he has the right to the presence of counsel. 23 If the suspect cannot afford to hire his own attorney one will
be appointed for him. 24

'9 See id. at 444 (concluding statements of defendant during
incommunicado interrogation without warning of constitutional rights violates
Fifth Amendment privilege); see also Noel Moran, Confessions Compelled by
Mental Illness: What's an Insane Person to do? Colorado v. Connelly, 56 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1049, 1064-65 (1988) (stating Miranda draws bright line rule
regarding admissibilty of statements).
20See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446-48; see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 426 (1986). The Court confirmed that custodial interrogations are
inherently coercive and that, as a result, there is a substantial risk that law
enforcement will abuse its authority to conduct a criminal investigation by
infringing upon a suspect's constitutional right. Id.
" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
22 Id.
23

ld.; see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (emphasizing that no

adverse inference can be drawn from exercise of right to remain silent).
24Miranda, 384

U.S. at 444.
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Furthermore, these warnings must be given in a clear manner and

are an absolute prerequisite to interrogation in all cases.25 It is irrelevant whether the suspect was already aware of his rights or whether
the officer knew that the suspect was familiar with his rights.26 Any
statements made by the defendant without the proper Mirandawarnings will be inadmissible in subsequent court proceedings.27

In limiting the scope of the decision in Miranda, the United
States Supreme Court has held that while statements made in viola-

tion of Miranda may not be used in the prosecutor's case-in-chief,
such statements are admissible for purposes of impeachment. 2' The

only prerequisite for29 admissibility for this purpose is that the statement is trustworthy.
Once the investigator properly administers Mirandawarnings, the

defendant may waive his rights and proceed to make a valid and admissible statement.3 ° Given the nature of the custodial interrogation,
however, the prosecution has the heavy burden of showing, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the waiver was in fact valid. 3 A defendant
Id. at 467-68.
26 Id. at 468.
'7Id. at 444.
28Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1972). "It does not follow from
25

Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case
in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of
the evidence satisfies legal standards." Id.; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 397-98(1978) (stating that statements in violation of Miranda are admissible
for impeachment if trustworthy).
29See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 720-24 (1975) (holding that Miranda
violative statements are admissible for impeachment as long as they are
trustworthy).
'0See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (holding that defendant may waive rights
after proper warnings have been given).
"' Id. at 475. Inherent to custodial interrogations is an atmosphere of
secrecy susceptible to unrestrained coercive police tactics that must be
controlled. Id. at 448. The Court has recognized that the suspect in these
situations is subject to psychological influences not easily detectable. Id. For this
reason, the Court stresses the importance of procedural safeguards in protecting
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must knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his rights.32 An
explicit statement of waiver is certainly a clear indication of the defendant's intent, but such precise language is not required. 33 It is sufficient to show that the defendant voluntarily relinquished his rights
based on the totality of the circumstances.34
A waiver cannot be made until the proper warnings have been
given.3 5 The arresting officer must give the warnings even if the suspect attempts to waive his ights prior to hearing the warnings.36 An
example of a valid waiver is an express statement made by the defendant indicating his wish to waive his rights coupled with an expression
of understanding those rights.37 Silence does not constitute a valid
the suspect's constitutional rights. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420
Mass. 666, 669, 651 N.E.2d 398, 401 (1995) (stating that the Commonwealth has
burden of proving validity of a Miranda waiver beyond a reasonable doubt). But
see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,168 (1986) (holding that a valid waiver
need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence).
32 Edwards, 420 Mass. at 670; see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421
(1986). A valid waiver has two distinct parts: it must be voluntary and free from
coercion, and the waiver must be made with a full awareness of both the nature
of the rights and the consequences attached to the act of waiving those rights.
Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Mass. 660, 664, 433 N.E.2d 878,
882 (1982) (stating that confessions are valid "only if the suspect actually
understands the impact of each Miranda warning"); Commonwealth v. Dustin,
373 Mass. 612, 616, 368 N.E.2d 1388, 1391 (1980) (holding that statements not
in compliance with Miranda must be excluded even if voluntary and reliable).
" See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). The issue of a
valid waiver is not one of form but rather an inquiry into whether the defendant
in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Id.
Id.; see also Edwards, 420 Mass. at 677-73, 651 N.E.2d at 402 (looking
at totality of circumstances to assess whether defendant exercised his free will
and rational intellect).
31See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (stating that warnings
are essential to ensure defendant understands privilege against selfincrimination).
36 See id. at 475-76 (holding that if a defendant makes statements
prior to
warnings this is not evidence of valid waiver).
31 See Moran, 475 U.S. at 422-23. The Court concluded that once
the
prosecution establishes that the suspect waived his rights voluntarily, was aware
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waiver, nor does the mere fact that a statement was ultimately obtained." Once the suspect makes a valid waiver he can choose to reinstate his rights at any time. 39 For example, after initially answering
some questions, a defendant may decide to invoke his right to remain
silent. 40 The law enforcement officer must then cease questioning
immediately. 4' Failure
to do so will result in suppression of any sub42
sequent statements.
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE
Confessions offered into evidence that were not elicited under
circumstances of custodial interrogation are protected by the Four-

of his right to counsel, and understood that the government could use his
statements against him, "the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a
matter of law." Id.; United States v. White, 451 F.2d 696, 700 (1971). An express
statement to the effect that the suspect does not want a lawyer present is not
necessary to find a valid waiver as long as the prosecution can prove that the
suspect was advised of his rights and knowingly and intelligently waived them.
Id.; Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 429, 399 N.E.2d 460, 466 (1980)
(reaffirming voluntariness of a confession upon showing that suspect actually
understood meaning of each Miranda warning).
" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (1966); see Commonwealth v. Cain, 361
Mass. 224, 228-29, 279 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1972) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
436). "The mere fact that, subsequently under interrogation, the defendant made
a statement, allegedly inculpatory, does not, of course, without more, give rise to
a presumption of a valid waiver." Id.
39 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
4 Id.
41 Id.
42

See Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Mass. 846, 854, 448 N.E.2d 1114,

1120 (1983).
[Tihe inquiry in examining whether the authorities acted unfairly after a
suspect invoked his right to remain silent is 'whether the authorities used
any words or actions, other than normally attendant to arrest and custody, that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.'
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teenth Amendment Voluntariness Doctrine. As we have seen, the
Fifth Amendment and Mirandawarnings are relevant only in cases of
custodial interrogation. 3 This distinction is made primarily because
the Court has recognized the inherently coercive nature of interrogations conducted while the suspect is in custody.44 Nonetheless, the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the protection of due process rights
even under less formal circumstances.45
In Brown v. Mississippi,46 the United States Supreme Court held
for the first time that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited states from using coerced confessions in an
effort to obtain a conviction.47 In this case, three men were convicted
of murder and sentenced to death based solely on their confessions.4
There was no other independent corroborating evidence to connect
the three defendants to the crime. 49 On the night of the murder, po43 See

Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 145, 430 N.E.2d 1198,
1202 (1982) (citing Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 309-10 (1967))
(emphasizing that Miranda requirements can be satisfied but confession not
admissible because it was not voluntarily obtained).
" See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (recognizing that custodial interrogations
put suspect at disadvantage due to police dominated environment).
41 See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass 422, 428, 399 N.E.2d
460, 465
(stating that whether there was a waiver and whether it was voluntary are
separate but related issues). Waiver relates to whether a defendant was given the
appropriate Miranda warnings and whether he made a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver. Id. Voluntariness relates to whether a defendant's statements
were made freely and voluntarily when considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances. Id. Commonwealth v. Valcourt, 333 Mass. 706, 711, 133 N.E.2d
217, 221 (1956). Although Miranda warnings in a non-custodial interrogation are
not necessary, it is a relevant inquiry and in fact may prove to be important
evidence to show that a confession was voluntarily made. Id. Commonwealth v.
Edwards, 420 Mass 666, 673, 651 N.E.2d 398, 403 (1995). Although waiver and
voluntariness are separate issues both are determined in light of the totality of the
circumstances and they share many relevant factors. Id.
46 297 U.S. 278
(1936).
47 Id.

41

Id. at 279-80.

49 Id.
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lice officials went to the homes of the defendants, brought them to the
crime scene and in front of a crowd of people hung them by their
necks and beat them until they confessed to the killing. 5o
On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected the state's
argument of immunity from compulsory protection against selfincrimination by pointing out that, while the state is free to operate
according to its own policies and laws, such privileges are clearly
limited. 5 ' Specifically, the Court held that the freedom of states to
follow their own dictates is limited by the requirement of due process
of law. 52 In this case, it was clear from the undisputed evidence that
the defendants had been denied their right to due process.53 The
Court warned that in cases involving a miscarriage of justice such as
was evident here there would be no hesitation to overrule the state's
54
judgment.
The decision in Brown made the due process requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment applicable to the states.55 Recognizing the
inherent injustice in coerced confessions, the Court clearly stated that

50 Id. at

281.
5,Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936).
52Id. "It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the
sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners,
and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and
sentence was a clear denial of due process." Id. at 286.
53Id.
M

Id. at 287.

"Id. at 278; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). The Court held that,
[T]he constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of state
officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether
the confession was 'free and voluntary; that is, [it] must not be
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any
direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion
of any improper influences.'
Id.; Id. at 7 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241(1942)) (marking shift
to federal standard in state cases by focusing on defendant's free choice to admit,
deny, or refuse to answer).
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such practices would not be tolerated.56 Almost three decades later
the Court in Malloy v. Hogan57 articulated a standard for determining
admissibility of confessions in criminal cases. 58 Returning to the standard set forth in Brain v. United States, 9 the Court reiterated the
need to assess whether the confession was made freely and voluntarily.60 In other words, in order for a confession to be admissible it
must have been obtained free from threats, violence, or other improper influences. 61 The Court stressed that "the right of a person to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak is the unfettered exercise of
56

Brown, 297 U.S. at 287 (quoting Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 134,

110 So. 361, 365 (1926)). "The duty of maintaining constitutional rights of a
person on trial for his life rises above mere rules of procedure, and whenever the
court is clearly satisfied that such violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such
violations and will apply the corrective." Id.
17 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
After pleading guilty to gambling charges, petitioner
was ordered to testify in connection with an investigation into gambling activity
within the county. Id. at 3. Petitioner refused to testify claiming his Fifth
Amendment privilege. Id. The court denied petitioner's writ of habeas corpus
stating that the Fifth Amendment was not available in a state proceeding. Id. On
a writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the state court's
ruling. Id. at 4.
58See id. at 11 (holding that the same standard applies at both state and
federal levels).
59168 U.S. 532 (1897). This case arose out of a murder committed on the
American ship Herbert Fuller on a journey from Boston to South America. Id. at
534. The first officer was accused and convicted of murdering the Captain of the
ship during the voyage. Id. The defendant appealed arguing that his confession
was coerced. Id. The Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts reversed the
judgment and set aside the verdict. Id. at 569.
60Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7; see also Bram, 168 U.S. at 549. The standard set
forth in Brain to determine the admissibility of statements focuses on whether the
suspect would have remained silent but for the improper influences exerted on
him by law enforcement. Id.
61 Bram, 168 U.S. at 549; Commonwealth
v. Williams, 388 Mass. 846,
856, 448 N.E.2d 1114, 1121 (1983). While there is no bright line rule for
assessing voluntariness, the totality of the circumstances should be considered to
ensure that the confession is not the product of inquisitorial activity that
overwhelmed the defendant's free will. Id.
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his own free will, and [he should] suffer no penalty.. .for such si62
lence.",
The Voluntariness Doctrine was designed to maintain the integrity of our system of jurisprudence by refusing to tolerate coercion of
any kind, whether physical or psychological. 63 The government must
prove a man's guilt through independent evidence properly obtained,
not through the manipulation of the defendant's will. 64 It is irrelevant
to the principles of the Doctrine whether statements made freely are
more or less likely to be true than statements made under duress.65
Rather, the focus must be on whether the prosecution has properly
obtained evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.66
In Colorado v. Connell.P7, the Court was faced with a case involving a defendant who attempted to suppress his confession not
because of police misconduct but because of his own mental condition at the time of his confession. 68 The defendant in this case returned to Colorado from Boston to confess to the murder of a young
girl. 69 Although the defendant admitted to a history of psychiatric
hospitalizations, he appeared coherent and alert to the police investigators. 70 After giving a detailed description of the crime, he then accompanied police to the crime scene. 71 By his own admission, there
were no issues at anytime of police coercion or misconduct.72

62Malloy,
63 Rogers

378 U.S. at 8.

v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 535-36 (1961). Suspect in a murder

investigation confessed to the crime after six hours of interrogation, and after
police threatened to take his ailing wife into custody for questioning. Id.
64d. at 540-41.
65 Id.

6Id.
6' 479

U.S. 157 (1986).

68Id.

69Id. at 160.
70 id.
71 Id.

72Colorado

v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 160 (1986).
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Relying on the standard set forth in Malloy v. Hogan, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's statements
were made based on his own free will and, therefore, reversed the
judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court excluding the statements. 73
In defending its holding, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
police misconduct is a necessary ingredient to the finding of an involuntary confession.74 Addressing the issue of a defendant's state of
mind, the Court acknowledged that it is a relevant factor but that,
standing alone, it will never warrant a finding of due process violation.75 Since the purpose of the Due Process Clause is to prevent the
unfair use of evidence rather than to safeguard against admissibility of
false evidence, the Court concluded that inquiries into a defendant's
state of mind are beyond the scope of the United States Constitution
and are better left to the judgment of state law makers. 76
IV. THE HUMANE PRACTICE DOCTRINE
Understanding the complexity and fundamental importance of the
Voluntariness Doctrine, courts in Massachusetts have established a
two step process to ensure that defendant's due process rights are
duly protected.77 Under the Humane Practice Doctrine, when the

73Id. at
74

170.

Id. at 164; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions
does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also
turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the
law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict
those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.

Id.
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164.
at 167; see Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961)

76 Id.

(warning that even if extrinsic evidence shows confessions are true they will be
inadmissible if obtained involuntarily).
" See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 432, 399 N.E.2d 460, 467
(1980) (quoting Commonwealth v. Marshall, 338 Mass. 460, 461-62, 155 N.E.2d
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prosecution attempts to admit a confession into evidence the presiding justice must make an initial determination of voluntariness in the
absence of the jury.78
If the judge rules the statements were voluntarily made they will
be properly admitted into evidence. 79 The judge, however, must instruct the jury that it is up to them to independently consider the issue
of voluntariness.80 The jury must not be told of the judge's preliminary determination of voluntariness.8 ' If, in light of all the evidence,
the jury finds that the statements were a product of coercion or undue
influence,
the jury must disregard the statements in reaching a ver82
dict.

798, 800 (1959)) (holding that judge determines admissibility but jury considers
issue of voluntariness in assessing weight of evidence).
71Id. at 432. In Garcia, defendant admitted killing the victim but
claimed
self-defense. Id. at 424. He appealed his conviction, arguing, among other
things, that the judge erroneously instructed the jury on the burden of proof
regarding voluntariness. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed the conviction. Id.
'9See Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544 (1967) (warning that judge's
preliminary determination of voluntariness "must appear from the record with
unmistakable clarity").
" Commonwealth v. Chung, 378 Mass. 451, 457, 392 N.E.2d 1015, 1019
(1979). "Should the judge admit the confession, and if credible evidence of
insanity at the time of the confession is presented to the jury, our practice
requires jury reconsideration as to the question of the defendant's rationality,
likewise 'as part of the issue of voluntariness."' Id.; Commonwealth v. Tavares,
385 Mass. 140, 152, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1206 (1982). The court held that when
voluntariness is a live issue the judge must instruct the jury that the
Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
statement was made voluntarily. Id. If the Commonwealth does not meet its
burden of proof, the jury must disregard the statement. Id.
81 Tavares, 385 Mass. at 149-53, 430 N.E.2d at 1204-06.
82 Chung, 378 Mass. at 458, 392 N.E.2d at 1020 ; Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 373 Mass. 21, 24, 364 N.E.2d 1211, 1213-14 (1977). "[U]nder our
practice the voluntariness of a confession is to be determined by the judge in the
first instance. If he rules that a confession is voluntary, he submits the same
question to the jury, instructing them not to consider the confession if they find it
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It is important to note that although the judicial finding is required under federal law, the subsequent jury instruction is not. 83 In
Massachusetts, however, this two step process known as the Humane
Practice Doctrine is well established.8 4 Whenever the issue of voluntariness is a live issue in the case the judge is bound to instruct the
jury of their duty to assess the voluntariness of the defendant's statements.85 The courts in Massachusetts go on to say that, while the
Humane Practice Doctrine is only mandatory in cases involving police
interrogation, the preferred practice is to follow the same standard in
cases involving statements made to private citizens.86
V. ISSUES CONCERNING MENTALLY RETARDED AND
MENTALLY ILL DEFENDANTS
The protections against self incrimination and involuntary confessions afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments focus primarily on the role and actions of the interrogator. The Constitution
has addressed the issue of protection from police coercion but little

to be involuntary." Id.; Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 387 Mass. 96, 99, 438
N.E.2d 856, 858 (1982) (holding that before statements made by defendant are
admitted to jury, judge must find beyond reasonable doubt that statements were
voluntary).
"' Chung, 378 Mass. at 456, 392 N.E.2d at 1019.
"Johnston, 373 Mass. at 24, 364 N.E.2d at 1214.
" Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164, 179, 461 N.E.2d 222, 232
(1984); see Commonwealth v. Parham, 390 Mass. 833, 841-42, 460 N.E.2d 589,
595-96 (1984) (holding that when voluntariness is a live issue the judge must sua
sponte follow the two step process, even without request from the defendant).
But see Commonwealth v. Anderson, 425 Mass. 685, 691, 682 N.E.2d 859, 864
(1997) ("[rlaising the issue of voluntariness before the trial and invoking the right
to a voir dire proceeding alone does not give rise to the obligation of the judge to
give the 'humane practice' instructions sua sponte").
86Paszko, 391 Mass. at 182-83, 461 N.E.2d at 233-34; see Commonwealth
v. Hunter, 416 Mass. 831, 834, 626 N.E.2d 873, 876 (1994) (applying humane
practice to statements made to private citizens).
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attention has been given to the characteristics of the accused.8 7 Although courts acknowledge that these issues must be decided on a
case by case basis focusing on the totality of the circumstances, almost no focus has been placed on the mental and intellectual capacity
of the particular defendant at issue.8s This raises concerns because so
much of what goes into deciding whether a valid waiver has been
made or whether a confession is voluntary rests on the premise that
the defendant understood his rights and the consequences of relinquishing those rights.89
Before discussing what special considerations, if any, should be
extended to people with mental retardation or mental illness, it is important to distinguish between these two conditions and consider the
possible impact that such afflictions may have on the person's ability
to interact with the criminal justice system. 90
The American Association of Mental Deficiency defines mental
retardation as a significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior. 9' One
of the most objective ways of measuring mental retardation is by
looking at the person's intelligence quotient, commonly known as the
IQ score. 92 With an average score of one hundred, the high end of
mental retardation is set at seventy or two standard deviations from

"' See James W. Ellis, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 414 (1985) (acknowledging that issues involving mentally
retarded defendants have received little attention from courts).
8

Id. at 414-15.

'9Moran, supra note 19, at 1067 (recognizing that "a rational intellect
inquiry requires examining the mental state of the defendant, and is, therefore,
often difficult for courts to determine").
90See Ellis, supra note 87, at 415 (recognizing that courts frequently
ignore the difference between mental retardation and mental illness).
91Ellis, supra note 87, at 445. "American courts have long recognized
that confessions by mentally retarded persons are somewhat suspect, although
they have not always been successful in articulating the reasons for their
skepticism." Id.
92 Id. at 422.
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the norm. 93 There are four categories of mental retardation: mild,
moderate, severe and profound. 94 Eighty nine percent of all people
categorized as mentally retarded95fall into the mild category with an IQ
score between fifty and seventy.
Some of the most common characteristics of people with mental
retardation include limited communication skills, impaired memory,
poor impulse control, and delayed moral development. 9' In terms of
their interaction with the criminal justice system there are some char97
acteristics that seem especially relevant and worthy of consideration.
Mentally retarded people often try to hide their cognitive limitations
and have a strong desire to please authority figures. 9 This may
manifest itself by a reluctance to admit not knowing an answer when
asked or offering an answer that will please or satisfy the interrogator.99
The primary difference between mental retardation and mental
illness is that mental retardation is a permanent condition that typically manifests itself by the time the person has turned eighteen. 100 In
addition, mental retardation is more easily quantified through tests
such as the IQ score. 10 ' Mental illness, however, is a complex psychological condition
that is difficult to measure and is always chang02
1
intensity.
in
ing
93

id.

94

d. at 423.
9'Id. at 428-29.
Ellis, supra note 18, at 428-29.
97 See Suzanne Lustig, Searching for Equal Justice: Criminal Defendants
96

with Mental Retardation, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, July 1995, at 32. Defendants
with mental retardation tend to display poor judgment because they do not
understand the consequences of their actions. Id. They also tend to be more
prone to suggestibility and to mask their disability making it difficult to detect
their limitations in some cases. Id.
9"Ellis, supra note 87, at 430-31.
9 Id.

,oo Id. at 423.
'0 ' Id. at

Id.

102

424.
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In recent years, courts have struggled with the issue of how to

measure whether or not a defendant has the mental capacity to understand his rights and make voluntary statements. 10 3 The courts have
recognized that an analysis of the totality of the circumstances must
include not only a review of the interrogation techniques used, but

also the mental characteristics of the defendant. 10 4 In fact, courts
have acknowledged that special consideration must be extended in
cases involving defendants with subnormal intelligence or mental capacity. 10'

103

See Paul T. Hourihan, Earl Washington's Confession: Mental

Retardation and the Law of Confessions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1471, 1488 (1995)
(emphasizing there are no guidelines to determine what level of mental
impairment is necessary to invalidate otherwise valid waiver).
,04 Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Mass. 660, 664-65, 433 N.E.2d
878,883 (1982); see also Commonwealth v. Chung, 378 Mass. 451, 456, 392
N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (1979) (recognizing that in the area of determining
voluntariness courts have become increasingly sensitive to the defendant's mental
condition); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 373 Mass. 21, 24, 364 N.E.2d 1211,
1214 (1977) (citing Commonwealth v. Masskow, 362 Mass. 662, 666, 290
N.E.2d 154, 157 (1972)) (holding that mental condition is a necessary factor to
consider in evaluating voluntariness); Hourihan, supra note 103, at 1489-90
(quoting Illinois v. Bemasco, 562 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. 1990)).
If intelligent knowledge in the Miranda context means anything,
it means the ability to understand the very words used in the
warnings. It need not mean the ability to understand farreaching legal and strategic effects of waiving one's rights, or to
appreciate how widely or deeply an interrogation may probe, or
to withstand the influence of stress or fancy; but to waive rights
intelligently and knowingly, one must at least understand basically what those rights encompass and minimally what their
waiver will entail.
Id.
'o'Cameron, 385 Mass. at 664, 433 N.E.2d at 882; see also Moran, supra
note 19, at 1069 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960)).
"Surely in the present state of our civilization a most basic sense of justice is
affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon the basis of a
statement he made while insane." Id.; Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Mass.
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The focus in cases involving mentally ill or mentally retarded defendants should not only be on whether the individual has the ability
to understand what is being said to him, but also on his heightened
vulnerability to otherwise acceptable police tactics. 0 6 This is especially so in cases involving custodial interrogation where defendants
might succumb to the pressure and intimidation inherent in the situation and offer a confession, not because they are guilty but because
they wish to please their
interrogators by giving what they perceive to
07
1
answer.
be the "right"
On the other hand, it is important to balance the analysis with an
appreciation of the fact that mentally retarded or mentally ill suspects
are not per se incapable of making a valid Mirandawaiver.'0 o In fact,
courts have been quick to point out that mental impediments do not
automatically render waivers invalid. 109 Courts in Massachusetts have

846, 852, 448 N.E.2d 1114, 1119 (1983) (recognizing that techniques of custodial
interrogation acceptable for adults of normal intelligence not appropriate for
minors or people with mental impairments); Hourihan, supra note 103, at 1503
(concluding that courts should take defendant's adaptive functioning into account
rather than simply looking at IQ score).
106 United States v. Hull, 441 F.2d 308,
312 (1971) (finding that 34 year
old man with mental age of eight or nine years was ill-equipped to handle
pressures of police interrogatior).
107 See id. at 312 (noting the vulnerability
of disabled persons in the
pressured environment of custodial interrogations). See generally Ellis, supra
note 87; Lustig, supra note 97.
'0'See Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 387 Mass. 96, 100, 438 N.E.2d 856,
859 (1982).
[Tlhere is no per se rule holding inadmissible (statements) given
by individuals suffering severe psychotic conditions. Rather, a
(statement) is inadmissible if it would not have been obtained
but for the effects of the confessor's psychosis. There is nothing
unfair about using the admissions of a psychotic individual
where the giving of the admissions is not substantially related to
the effects of the psychosis.
Id.
See Commonwealth v. Wallen, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 915, 917, 619 N.E.2d
365, 367 (1993) (emphasizing that adult with diminished mental capacity is
'9

290

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE AD VOCA CY [Vol. IV

pointed out that there is no per se rule disallowing statements solely
because the speaker suffers from a mental condition. " Such statements are inadmissible only if they would not have been made but for
the defendant's impairment, or if the defendant is unable to understand the ramifications of his statement or the need for selfprotection."' However, under these circumstances, the prosecution
bears the heavy burden of proving the voluntariness of the defendant's waiver. 12
The analysis for determining the voluntariness of a statement
made by a mentally retarded defendant is similar to the Miranda
waiver analysis." 3 Again, since the issue of voluntariness has to do
primarily with the ability to reason and understand consequences,
courts have held that judges must take into consideration the defendant's mental condition.114 If the defendant introduces evidence indicating mental impairment at the time the statement was made the
judge must consider whether the statement was the product of a rational intellect. 15

capable of effectively waiving rights and rendering knowing and voluntary
confession).
,,o See Vazquez, 387 Mass. at 100, 438 N.E.2d at 859; see also
Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164, 175-76, 461 N.E.2d 222, 229 (1984)
(holding that there is no per se rule against admission of confessions made by
someone suffering from drug withdrawal); Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 395
Mass. 336, 347, 479 N.E.2d 1371, 1380 (1985) (reaffirming that mentally
retarded adult is capable of making voluntary, knowing, and admissible
confession).
...
See Vazquez, 387 Mass. at 100, 438 N.E.2d at 859.
"2See Paszko, 391 Mass. at 175-76, 461 N.E.2d at 230.
113 See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 670, 651 N.E.2d 398,
401 (1995) (stating that test is essentially the same under both Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments although they are two separate and distinct inquiries).
"4 See Vazquez, 387 Mass. at 99, 438 N.E.2d
at 858; United States v. Hull,
441 F.2d 308, 312 (1971) "Mental or emotional instability, low intelligence and
immaturity have been recognized as important factors in determining the
voluntariness of confessions." Id.
"' Vazquez, 387 Mass. at 99, 438 N.E.2d at 859. The court determined
that the defendant's statement was a product of his free will by relying on the
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In 1986, the United States Supreme Court recognized that police
conduct was not the sole variable for determining the voluntariness of
a statement. 116 Just as external conditions may have an impact on the
analysis so too does the defendant's emotional state of mind.1 7 Although the Court focused primarily on cases of severe mental illness,
the door was at least opened to the possibility that one's mental status
was a legitimate concern for purposes of assessing voluntariness. 1"
The appreciation for the impact of a defendant's mental condition
on the ability to make a voluntary statement raises the question of
how to determine whether the defendant does, in fact, suffer from any
9 After all, before any thought may be given to
mental impediment. 11
what standard of practice is appropriate to ensure that rights are protected, one must first establish that cognitive functions are, in fact,
limited.
Courts in Massachusetts have attempted to address this issue by
holding that police officers can base their opinion on the defendant's
external characteristics. 12 Most importantly, police may consider
whether the defendant made an express statement indicating his understanding of his rights, the fact that he has waived those rights, and
his willingness to engage in conversation.' 2' This approach offers a

expert testimony of two psychiatrists. Id. Specifically, the court considered the
fact that the defendant's statements followed chronological order, were coherent,
and exculpatory. Id.
"6Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 137, 159 (1986).
..Id. at 162.
11' Id. at 165.
The Court stated that, "while mental condition is surely
relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of
the defendant's mind can never conclude the due process inquiry." Id.
"9See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960) (recognizing that
"facts such as youth and lack of education are more easily ascertained than the
imbalance of a human mind").
20 See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 430, 399 N.E.2d 460,
465 (1980) (holding that suspect's outward behavior can be used as indicator that
he understands his rights).
121

id.
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concrete method of solving what is, in fact, a much more complex
psychological and cognitive issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
A delicate balance must be struck between protecting all citizens
from involuntarily making self incriminating statements while at the
same time not allowing mental illness to serve as a shield against the
consequences of a truly voluntary confession. In Miranda,the Court
articulated a standard to ensure proper admissibility of confessions.
The problem that the Court did not foresee, however, is that the standard is not easily applied in cases involving mentally deficient defendants. The ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of warnings such as the right to remain silent and the right to the presence of
counsel presupposes a certain level of cognitive sophistication that is
not always present. 122
Courts are moving in the right direction in terms of acknowledging the importance of considering the defendant's mental condition as
part of the analysis for determining the voluntariness of a statement.
Law enforcement officers should continue to follow the dictates of
Miranda in cases of custodial interrogation with all defendants. If a
defendant acknowledges his rights and expresses, either directly or
indirectly, his wish to waive those rights, officers should be free to
proceed with the interrogation. It is unreasonable to expect law enforcement officers to assess the psychological condition of the defendant beyond obvious signs and indicators.
Therefore, in cases where police coercion is not present, the burden should be on the defendant to raise the issue of mental incapacity
in an effort to suppress incriminating statements. Furthermore, since
we have seen that courts will not exclude statements simply because
there is a showing of mental illness, the defendant must prove that his

122

See Ellis, supra note 87, at 447 (stating the three main elements of a

valid waiver are capacity, information, and voluntariness, each of which present
particular problems when dealing with a mentally retarded defendant).
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illness had a direct 3and significant impact on his ability to make a vol2
untary statement.
Mental illness, unlike mental retardation, is a variable condition
that changes in intensity and effect on one's ability to function. Factors such as medication and counseling may also effect the acuteness
of the condition. Therefore, when assessing the impact of the illness
on the ability to make a voluntary confession the focus should be on
the defendant's state of mind at the time the statement was made.
Because it may be difficult for an expert witness, unfamiliar with the
defendant prior to trial, to make such an assessment based on subsequent evaluations extrinsic evidence would be very useful to show the
circumstances at the time the confession was made. 24 For instance,
the court could examine whether the defendant was employed at the
time, whether he lived independently, or any other factors which
would shed light on the defendant's overall ability to function in the
community.
Clearly, law enforcement practices play a central role in the
evaluation of whether a statement was made voluntarily by a mentally
retarded defendant. The officer conducting the interrogation should
pay careful attention to the extrinsic cues that the defendant is demonstrating in assessing whether he is capable of understanding
Mirandawarnings. Although it would be unrealistic to expect a law
enforcement officer to make a clinical assessment about the suspect's
mental and cognitive abilities, if there is a suspicion of diminished capacities added care should be extended to ensure that the defendant's
rights are presented as clearly and concretely as possible.
Alisia St. Florian

Moran, supra note 19, at 1070.

"[O]nly those mental illnesses
demonstrating a high probability that the confessor lacked the faculties necessary
to make a reliable statement should result in suppression of the evidence." Id.
124 See id. at
1072-73 (stating that extrinsic evidence could provide
independent reliability for the inherent untrustworthiness of an insane person's
confession).
1

